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A LOOK BACK

-

ONE LAWYER'S VIEW

W Dexter Douglass*
This Article deals with aspects of the 2000 presidential election litigation
from the standpoint of a member of the Gore-Lieberman Florida legal team.
This discussion analyzes the team's decision to pursue relief under the
election "protest" statute,' which directs recounts in individual counties

* W. Dexter Douglass is President of Douglass Law Firm, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida. He
was a member of the Gore-Lieberman legal team in the election litigation conducted in Florida.
1. FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000), Protest of election returns; procedure (1) Any candidate for nomination or election, or any elector qualified to vote in
the election related to such candidacy, shall have the right to protest the returns
of the election as being erroneous by filing with the appropriate canvassing board
a sworn, written protest.
(2) Such protest shall be filed with the canvassing board prior to the time the
canvassing board certifies the results for the office being protested or within 5
days after midnight of the date the election is held, whichever occurs later.
(4)(a) Any candidate whose name appeared on the ballot, any political
committee that supports or opposes an issue which appeared on the ballot, or any
political party whose candidates' names appeared on the ballot may file a written
request with the county canvassing board for a manual recount. The written
request shall contain a statement of the reason the manual recount is being
requested.
(c) The county canvassing board may authorize a manual recount. If a manual
recount is authorized, the county canvassing board shall make a reasonable effort
to notify each candidate whose race is being recounted of the time and place of
such recount.
(d) The manual recount must include at least three precincts and at least 1
percent of the total votes cast for such candidate or issue. In the event there are
less than three precincts involved in the election, all precincts shall be counted.
(5) If the manual recount indicates an error in the vote tabulation which could
affect the outcome of the election, the county canvassing board shall:
(c) Manually recount all ballots.
(6) Any manual recount shall be open to the public.
(7) Procedures for a manual recount are as follows:
(a) The county canvassing board shall appoint as many counting teams of at least
two electors as is necessary to manually recount the ballots. A counting team
must have, when possible, members of at least two political parties....
(b) If a counting team is unable to determine a voter's intent in casting a ballot,
the ballot shall be presented to the county canvassing board for it to determine
the voter's intent.
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rather than proceeding with a "contest" of the election Also discussed are
the effects of media coverage on the team's work.
Vice President Gore, one week after election day, proposed a total state
recount, including overvotes and undervotes, with both campaigns to be
bound by the result. The Bush campaign rejected this proposal.
The Florida lawyers with experience applying election laws believed that
a protest, which would result in selected counties conducting the counting
through their canvassing boards, was not the best and most likely way to
obtain a fair count. Instead, this group of lawyers urged that individual
protests be abandoned and that an election contest under Florida law be
filed after the Secretary of State certified the winning slate on November
14, 2000.
They believed such a contest would have placed the entire counting, reexamination, and the adoption of rules to test all ballots under one judge in
Tallahassee who could utilize the entire judicial system of the State. Such
a proceeding could have brought a conclusion in all the areas of dispute.

2. FLA STAT. § 102.168 (2000), Contest of election (1) ... the certification of election or nomination of any person to office,...
may be contested in the circuit court by any unsuccessful candidate for such
office or nomination thereto or by any elector qualified to vote in the election
related to such candidacy, or by any taxpayer, respectively.
(2) Such contestant shall file .... with the clerk of the circuit court within 10
days after midnight of the date the last county canvassing board empowered to
canvass the returns certifies the results of the election being contested...
(c) Receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes
sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election.
(e) Any other cause or allegation which, if sustained, would show that a person
other than the successful candidate was the person duly nominated or elected to
the office in question or that the outcome of the election on a question submitted
by referendum was contrary to the result declared by the canvassing board or
election board.
(7) Any candidate, qualified elector, or taxpayer presenting such a contest to a
circuit judge is entitled to an immediate hearing. However, the court in its
discretion may limit the time to be consumed in taking testimony, with a view
therein to the circumstances of the matter and to the proximity of any succeeding
primary or other election.
(8) The circuit judge to whom the contest is presented may fashion such orders
as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is
investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and
to provide any relief appropriate under such circumstances.
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The lower court's order then could have been reviewed by the Florida
Supreme Court and made final in a prompt manner before the "safe harbor"
date
This action would have placed all the ballots underjudicial control. The
court could have reviewed each county's handling and counting of the
ballots with each circuit having its judges act as agents of the court. That
procedure alone would have prevented the furor over how to decide the
intent-of-voter issues. Absentee ballot problems also could have been
avoided by preventing the inclusion of ballots cast too late or mailed after
the deadline.
The position adopted by the Gore-Lieberman campaign was to rely on
the protest statute,4 based on the assumption that a protest limited to four
counties would obtain sufficient additional votes for Gore to win the
election. This strategy also assumed that the Gore-Lieberman ticket could
gain enough votes by counting ballots rejected as undervotes5 and
overvotes by the machines in Volusia, Palm Beach, Broward and MiamiDade counties, all Gore-Lieberman strongholds. This belief was predicated
on the further assumption that a majority of the uncounted ballots, when
manually examined would show that Gore had out-polled Bush by a
sufficient number of votes to make him the winner in Florida and thus the
next President. The result from this count would decide the election well
prior to December 12, 2000.
The campaign policy advisors, as opposed to the legal advisors,
premised their position to proceed with a protest on the belief that Mr.
Gore had determined that under no circumstances did he want to take any
divisive action that would splinter the nation and harm the public perception
of the government. They decided to make the 2000 presidential challenge
by protest6 with the belief that this would result in a quick resolution of the
election. This quick resolution would avoid the false perception, and
vigorous Republican contention that the Vice-President wanted the
presidency so badly that he would do anything to win. If Governor Bush
was certified the winner, a 'contest' of the election might appear as an
attempt to overthrow his valid election.

3. Stated by the U.S. Supreme Court as December 12, 2000, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,
122 (2000).
4. FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000).
5. Undervotes were ballots on which no vote for president was recorded.
6. FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000).
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The protest method resulted in the necessity for an extension of
statutory time" to complete the counts in the three chosen counties. The
Secretary of State of Florida, Katherine Harris, had the authority to extend
the time but refused. The suit heard around the world and the centerpiece
of the litigation moved to the courtroom of Circuit Judge Terry Lewis in
Leon County. There the Gore-Lieberman complaint sought to force the
Secretary of State to extend the time to count the uncounted ballots in four
counties
Judge Lewis ruled that the Secretary of State had the authority to
extend the time and ordered her to exercise her sound discretion after she
considered the requests of the three counties still pending. Once again,
Secretary Harris refused to extend the time. Judge Lewis then found that
Secretary Harris's reason for refusing the extension of time to accept the
ballot results from Palm Beach, Broward and Miami-Dade Counties was
not an abuse of discretion and refused to order her to do so. Judge Lewis'
order, however, supplied a gentle suggestion that the plaintiffs could
proceed to contest under Florida law after she certified the election results.
However, the appeal ensued. The Florida Supreme Court predictably
ordered the extension and directed that the counting proceed and the results
be filed by Sunday, November 26, 2000, at 5:00 p.m. by the filing of
amended returns.9 This ruling was a correct and appropriate application
of Florida law. However, the Gore team now faced a desperate situation
with time expiring and with the local canvassing boards in Palm Beach and
Miami-Dade Counties in turmoil and not moving forward.
The Secretary, at the first possible moment under the court's order
(5:00 p.m., November 26, 2000), certified all Florida's electoral college
electors as pledged to Bush even though the vote counting was incomplete
in Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties. The inclusion of Broward and
part of Palm Beach reduced Bush's lead to 154 votes, which included some
illegally cast absentee ballots.
The media coverage was so massive and overwhelming that many,
including some of the participants, thought the judicial proceedings would
become meaningless in the final analysis. Just the opposite actually
happened.
It should be understood that the legal teams representing the parties,
because ofthe unprecedented speed required in handling the various cases,
made television coverage the main source of a record for those preparing
pleadings and briefs. While the trial lawyers were consumed in court, the

7. FLA. STAT. §§ 102.111, .112 limited the recount to the seven days after the election,

with 102.112 providing the basis for discretionary extension in exceptional circumstances.
8. Volusia was counted before November 14,2000, and therefore was not continued in the
suit leaving Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade Counties in litigation.
9. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
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other team members were following a record in progress being made on
television while preparing briefs and memoranda anticipating any result.
Lawyers prepared briefs based on any ruling possible, and opposite position
papers were an ongoing project at all times.
This preparation was possible because accurate information about court
activity was available instantly through the live television coverage. CNN
and C-Span played on some ten to twelve television receivers in the GoreLieberman trial team headquarters with at least five or six more following
the major networks' coverage.
The commentary by "experts" on the networks did not go unnoticed and
certain commentators were quite incisive and helped the team feel sure that
all avenues were explored and briefed.
The Bush political team's strategy appeared to be aimed at preventing
the addition of uncounted votes and making the exclusion of alleged
illegally cast absentee votes appear as an attack on voting by overseas
military personnel. This strategy was primarily a public relations effort and
not the device of the lawyers trying the case in court. While it is true that
the Bush team's lawyers, the Secretary of State's lawyers and virtually all
of the intervenors were following a course designed to delay the final ruling
in the court cases, that effort on the part of the actual Bush legal team was
done appropriately, professionally, and with arguable justification.
Such was not the case with the Bush political team which rushed into
the fray with the operatives of the Republicans in Congress. Their tactics
successfully defeated the protest option by delaying the vote count in Palm
Beach County, preventing a full count, and virtually excluding any count in
Miami-Dade.
On November 27, 2000, the Gore legal team filed the election contest
under Florida Statutes section 102.168 and a new judge, N. Sanders Sauls,
was randomly assigned. This resulted in a trial judge who was not familiar
with the case hearing it. Consequently, with time running out, a final delay
was experienced which actually became fatal to the Gore quest to count the
votes.
After a week of proceedings before the new judge with little progress,
Judge Sauls ruled for Bush on all points and refused to look at the
contested ballots from Palm Beach and Miami-Dade Counties, which had
been delivered to the Leon County Courthouse on his order.
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court ordered the manual count of all
the undervotes in the entire state under the direction of the trial court. It
directed the circuit court judges to supervise the count in each county.'
Judge Sauls recused himself and Judge Lewis was assigned to preside. The
count and recount was in progress and would have been completed prior

10. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (2000).
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to December 12th, the date the U.S. Supreme Court had said was the last
day the "Safe Harbor"", provision would apply. In effect, this meant that
the winner of the contest, if the count was completed by then, would be
protected from competing slates of delegates, including the one certified on
November 26th and one adopted by the Florida Legislature as it had
promised if that one was overturned.
The U.S. Supreme Court stopped the vote count on the morning of
December 9,2000.12 The language in Justice Scalia's opinion, concurred in
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Thomas,
stated: "The counting of votes that are of questionable legality does in my
view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner Bush, and to the country, by
casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitmacy of his election."' 3
The "petitioner" he referred to was, of course, George W. Bush. The
Court then heard oral argument and entered its opinion which is not
discussed here.' 4
The Gore team concluded that even if the count was completed after
December 12th and Gore won the Florida vote, the U.S. Supreme Court
would declare that the election would go to Congress to choose between
competing elector slates.
The counting could not be completed in the hours left under the Court's
opinion, and two slates would have been presented to Congress - the
Florida legislative slate which was promised for Bush, and the slate based
on the accurate vote count assuming it would have been for Gore, and
perhaps the November 26th certified slate signed by Governor Jeb Bush. A
Republican majority awaited in the House of Representatives and the
Senate at that time would have gone to Gore by a 51-50 vote. The House
would then vote with each state having one vote. Bush would have won
that vote.
Vice President Gore was left with a choice; concede or request the
Florida court to set the rules for counting, then continue to count, well
beyond the safe harbor date.
He chose to do the right thing in his view. Few will ever forget the next
to final act in the play when the television persons were trying to read and
explain the final U.S. Supreme Court opinion that shut down the election
process. It was prophetic when Justice Scalia pointed out that when the
counting was stopped, the president-elect was George W. Bush. 5

11. The "Safe Harbor" provision described the Federal Statute giving a date that any state
could meet in certifying its electors which could not be attacked. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
12. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).

13. Id.
14. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
15. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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As a personal postscript to the case, I was one of the last people in
Tallahassee to speak with the Vice President in the early morning of
December 13th, the day of his concession.
I felt I was privy to a momentous decision. Even though he could have
carried on the fight, he concluded, regardless of the outcome, it would
cause an unacceptable division among the people of the nation which would
probably scar the functions of government for many years.
It then came to me that all of his decisions in the conduct of the case
were made in that context. This very dedication to the principles of
America was also the basic reason for avoiding an election contest, which
probably allowed George W. Bush to assume the presidency.
Then the bittersweet finale came when the person who more Americans
voted to be president was denied victory, but courageously accepted the
supremacy of the rule of law. That is the one principle that binds our nation
and guarantees our freedom. He accepted it.
Vice President Gore may not have become the President of the greatest
nation on earth, but he gave it complete devotion equal to that of any
political person in America's history.

